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FCC V LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS: CONDITIONS ON
FEDERAL FUNDING THAT INHIBIT SPEECH AND
SUBJECT MATTER RESTRICTIONS ON SPEECH
INTRODUCTION

In FCC v. League of Women Voters, I the United States Supreme

Court declared unconstitutional a federal ban on editorializing by
noncommercial broadcast stations that receive funding from the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting. The decision, a five to four
vote,2 held that the editorializing ban incorporated in section 399 of
the Public Broadcasting Act of 19673 violates the first amendment 4
of the United States Constitution.
Beyond removing an unnecessary restriction on free expression, League of Women Voters has two wide-ranging effects on first
amendment doctrine in general. First, the Court rejected the proposition that Congress needs only a rational basis and a benign purpose to place conditions that inhibit free expression on the receipt
of federal funding. The Court thus prevented Congress from using
the spending power to limit free expression. Second, the Court affirmed that all content-based restrictions on expression are suspect
and require close judicial scrutiny. The Court refused to bifurcate
the constitutional standard for subject matter restrictions based on
whether the ban is viewpoint-neutral or viewpoint-discriminatory.
By aggregating and protecting against all subject matter restrictions,
the Court both encourages unfettered discussion of controversial
topics and removes the confusion surrounding subject matter
restrictions.
1

104 S. Ct. 3106 (1984).

2 Justice Brennan wrote the Court's opinion and was joined by Justices Marshall,
Powell, Blackmun, and O'Connor. Justice Rehnquist dissented, joined by ChiefJustice
Burger and Justice White. Justice Stevens dissented separately.
3

Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-129, 82 Stat. 365 (codified as

amended at 47 U.S.C. § 399 (1982)).
Section 399 states in relevant part:
No noncommercial educational broadcasting station which receives a
grant from the Corporation [for Public Broadcasting]...

may engage in

editorializing. No noncommercial educational broadcasting station may
support or oppose any candidate for political office.
47 U.S.C. § 399 (1982).

The second restriction within § 399 applies regardless of

whether a licensee receives funds from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. The
League of Women Voters did not challenge this restriction.
4 "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
" U.S. CONST. amend. I.
press ....
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I
CONGRESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT WITH THE
BROADCAST MEDIA

A.

The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967

In 1967 the Carnegie Foundation released the results of a study
focusing on the problems facing noncommercial television. 5 The
study recommended both increased public spending for educational
television 6 and creation of an independent nonprofit corporation to
7
channel these funds from the federal government to local stations.
Congress adopted these recommendations as the "blueprint" of the
Public Broadcasting Act of 1967.8 Title II of that Act created the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB). 9
The creation of the CPB reflected widespread concern that the
government not become a censor by conditioning federal funds on
the broadcast of particular programming.1 0 Instead, the CPB acts as
a middleman between Congress and licensees. The Corporation receives funds from the federal government and distributes the largesse to noncommercial licensees, thereby insulating the recipients
from governmental or political pressure. Congress also provided
safeguards for the neutrality of the CPB. A bipartisan board of directors, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of
the Senate, governs the CPB."I The Corporation may not own or
5

CARNEGIE COMM'N ON EDUC. TELEVISION, PUBLIC TELEVISION: A PROGRAM FOR

ACTION (1967).
6 Id. at 33-34, 36-37.
7 Id. at 37-38.
8 League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. at 3112.
9
10

Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365, 367.
League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. at 3121. The Senate report on the Act stated in

part:
There is a general agreement that for the time being, Federal financial
assistance is required to provide the resources necessary for quality programs. It is also recognized that this assistance should in no way involve
the Government in programming or program judgments. An independ-

ent entity supported by Federal funds is required to provide programs
free of political pressures. The Corporation for Public Broadcasting, a
nonprofit private corporation ...

provides such an entity ....

Your committee has heard considerable discussion about the fear of
Government control or interference in programming if [the Act] is enacted. We wish to state in the strongest terms possible that it is our intention that local stations be absolutely free to determine for themselves
what they should or should not broadcast.
S. REP. No. 222, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 11, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1772, 1775, 1782.
11 Congress modified the structure of the Board in 1981 to provide for 10 rather

than 15 members. Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1225(a)(1), 95 Stat. 726, 727 (1981) (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 396(c) (1982)).
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operate a broadcasting station 12 and must function "in ways that will
most effectively assure the maximum freedom" for local licensees
regarding program content.1 3 No federal agency, officer, or employee may exercise control over the CPB or local broadcast
stations. 14
B.

The Editorializing Ban

The editorializing ban in the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967
reflects Congress's concern that the government not be allowed to
influence broadcasters because of the latter's dependence on government outlays. Banning broadcaster editorials removes any opInterestingly, neither the
portunity for such influence.
administration's initial proposal' 5 nor the original Senate version of
the Act included a ban on editorializing. 16 A House amendment added the ban "out of an abundance of caution." 17 Some congressional supporters touted the ban as a means to prevent the CPB
from becoming a propaganda agency for either political party or
from presenting only a particular point of view.' 8 Although the goal
of maintaining broadcasters' autonomy is consistent with other provisions of the Act, the legislative history reveals other, less altruistic
motives behind the adoption of section 399. Some members of Congress endorsed the editorializing ban to silence a potential source of
political criticism. For instance, Representative Springer, a chief
proponent of the editorializing ban, noted that "[t]here are some of
us who have very strong feelings because we have been editorialized
against."19
12

47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(3) (1982).

13
14

Id. § 396(g)(1)(D).

Id. § 398(a).
Johnson, Special Message to Congress: Education and Health in America, 1967
PUB. PAPERS 244, 250.
16
S. 1160, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
17
H.R. REP. No. 572, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 1799, 1810.
13 CONG. REC. 26,383 (1967).
18
19 Hearings on H.R. 6736 and S. 1160 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 641 (1967) (statement of Rep. William L. Springer),
quoted in League of Women Voters at 3121-22 n.18.
Understandably, appellees stressed § 399's legislative history in their brief. A subheading of appellee's principal argument reads, "1. The Articulated Congressional Desire to Suppress Critical Editorial Comment Is Not a Legitimate Government Interest."
Brief for Appellees at 21, FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106 (1984).
Appellees' brief also cited the following incriminating remarks:
(Rep. Keith: "It is conceivable that [a certain noncommercial television
broadcast] could ... have adversely affected any candidacy for re-election."); (Rep. Joelson: "Those of us in public office are in a position
where newspapers, radio, or TV stations can say anything they wish about
us.... Therefore, the right of editorializing should be very, very carefully scrutinized."); (Rep. McClure: "Witnesses before the committee not
15
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The Federal Communication Commission's Policy On
Licensee Editorializing and Section 399

The Federal Communication Commission (FCC) is the federal
agency charged with regulating the broadcast industry.20 Prior to
passage of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, the FCC used the
general powers in its enabling legislation to regulate broadcaster
editorializing. Congress commanded only that the FCC grant radio
and television broadcast licenses to those who serve the "public in21
terest, convenience, and necessity.
In 1940 the FCC admonished a radio licensee because the
broadcaster routinely editorialized. The agency stated that editorializing reflects "a serious misconception of [a licensee's] duties and
functions under the law." 22 The Commission asserted that a "truly
23
free radio cannot be used to advocate the causes of the licensee."
In 1949, however, the FCC reversed its position and permitted
broadcasters to editorialize subject to the "fairness doctrine"-an
existing requirement that licensees present controversial issues in
an evenhanded manner.2 4 The Commission recognized that the ban
on editorializing had deprived the public of relevant information,
25
thereby threatening the development of an informed electorate.
Overt editorializing, the Commission reasoned, also will be helpful
because "the public has less to fear from the open partisan than
from the covert propagandist." 2 6 Given the fairness doctrine, the
only saw public television as a force for social good, but said it should and
will crusade. Crusade for what? I suppose that by the time I have finished this speech, it might well be a crusade for my opponent in next
year's election."); (Rep. Devine: "I understand that there is one educational TV station out on the west coast that a bunch of 'hippies' are running .... This is one of the areas in which we have had to work very
hard in order to try to provide some safeguards.").
Id. at 22 n.32 (citations omitted).
The remarkable legislative history of § 399 has not escaped notice by other commentators. See, e.g., Toohey, Section 399: The Constitution Giveth and Congress Taketh Away,
6 EDUC. BROADCASTING REV. 31, 34 (1972) ("The purpose of Section 399 was clear: to
prevent Congress from creating a monster that might someday turn on its creator.");
Note, The Public BroadcastingAct: The Licensee EditorializingBan and the FirstAmendment, 13
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 541, 548-49 (1980) ("This debate suggests that the true reason for
the inclusion of section 399(a) was to win the support of reluctant congressmen who
feared the potential criticism of public broadcasters.") (footnote omitted). For an extensive discussion of the role that legislative motive plays in judicial review of statutes, see
Ely, LegislativeandAdministrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
20 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
21
Id. § 309(a).
22 In re Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333, 339 (1940).
23 Id. at 340.
24 In re Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). For discussion of the "fairness doctrine," see infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
25
13 F.C.C. at 1249.
26 Id. at 1254. The FCC continued to allow stations not subject to § 399 to editori-
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FCC concluded that editorials will both inform the public evenhandedly and indicate clearly what commentary is the personal opinion
27
of the licensee.
Section 399 overrode the FCC's decision to allow public broadcaster editorializing. Exercising its administrative jurisdiction, the
FCC has interpreted section 399 to preclude a licensee from broadcasting its own or its management's opinions, or the opinions of
others who speak on behalf of the licensee. 28 The FCC has stated,
however, that section 399 does not prevent guests, interviewees, or
employees of the broadcaster from stating their personal opinions. 29 Further, public broadcasters may continue to present programming on controversial public issues. 30 In short, the FCC has
interpreted the editorializing ban to prevent only the expression of
personal opinion by or on behalf of the licensee.
D.

The First Amendment as Applied to the Broadcast Media

Traditionally, the Supreme Court has afforded the broadcast
media a reduced level of first amendment protection because of the
unique physical attributes of the medium. The critical characteristic
of this medium is the limited number of frequencies over which
broadcast signals may travel. Because of this physical limitation,
known as "spectrum scarcity," the government licenses broadcasters 3 1 -a practice no one would accept if applied to the print media.
Without such intervention, however, there would be a "cacophony
32
of competing voices," and no single broadcaster could be heard.
The Court has recognized that broadcast frequencies are a scarce
alize. Indeed,' the frequency of editorial programming is one of the elements the FCC
considers in license renewal proceedings. 25 Fed. Reg. 7295 (1960). See In re Evening
Star Broadcasting Co., 27 F.C.C.2d 316, 332 (1971); In re RKO General, Inc., 44
F.C.C.2d 149, 219 (1969).
27
13 F.C.C. at 1258.
28 In re Accuracy in Media, Inc., 45 F.C.C.2d 297 (1973). The FCC also stated that
§ 399 should be interpreted to prohibit programs "commonly recognized as editorializing." Id. at 302. The definition implies that such programs deal with "controversial
issues of public importance" and that the broadcast of the licensees' views on controversial issues of public importance is therefore proscribed editorializing. Id. In In re Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, the FCC defined editorializing as "the use of radio facilities
by the licensees thereof for the expression of the opinions and ideas of the licensee on
.. . various controversial and significant issues." 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1252 (1949).
29 In re Accuracy in Media, Inc., 45 F.C.C.2d at 302.
30

Id.

Under the Communications Act of 1934, no television or radio broadcast station
may operate without a license granted by the FCC. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). Licensees
must apply for renewal of their licenses every three years, and the FCC will grant an
initial license or a renewal only if it finds that "the public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served thereby." 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1982). The Supreme Court upheld
the license requirement in NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
32 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969).
31
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resource and must be regulated in the public interest. 33
The fairness doctrine represents another government regulation unique to the broadcast medium. In the 1969 case Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,3 4 the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's fairness doctrine against a first amendment challenge. The fairness
doctrine, the Court found, imposes a twofold duty on broadcast
licensees: "The broadcaster must give adequate coverage to public
issues, . . . and coverage must be fair in that it accurately reflects
the opposing views." 3 5 The doctrine applies when a broadcaster
36
presents one side "of a controversial issue of public importance."
Although such a requirement applied to the print media would
clearly violate the first amendment,3 7 the Red Lion Court stated that
because of spectrum scarcity "it is idle to posit an unabridgeable
first amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every
individual to speak, write, or publish." 38 The Court reasoned that a
broadcast licensee is a public fiduciary because the broadcaster is
entrusted with a valuable and limited resource.39 The fairness doctrine arises from that fiduciary role because the licensee has an obligation to present "views. . . which would otherwise. . . be barred
40
from the airwaves."
41
In 1973 the Court ruled in CBS v. DemocraticNational Committee
that Red Lion does not support a first amendment right of access for
paid editorial statements. The Court recognized that the government's role in the broadcast industry resembles a "tightrope" 4 2 act
because of the tension between the necessity for government regulation and the widely shared desire to allow broadcasters the "widCBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973).
394 U.S. 367 (1969).
Id. at 377.
36 In re Accuracy in Media, Inc., 45 F.C.C.2d 297, 299 (1973).
37 The Supreme Court has rejected an attempt to apply a right of access or a fairness doctrine to the print media. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241 (1974), the Court struck down a Florida statute that required newspapers to give
free reply space to political candidates whom the paper had criticized.
The important distinction between the broadcast and print media is that the former
enjoy a legal monopoly necessitated by spectrum scarcity. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 37576. The monopoly status of broadcasters justifies the fairness doctrine as a means to
ensure that the public is adequately and fairly informed. Id. at 375-79. See generally J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONsTrrboNAL LAW 902 (1983).
38 395 U.S. at 388.
39 Id. at 389 ("There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct
himself as a proxy or fiduciary ..
"). See also FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct.
at 3116 ("[G]iven spectrum scarcity, those who are granted a license to broadcast must
serve in a sense as fiduciaries for the public .
40 395 U.S. at 389.
41 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
42 Id. at 105.
33
34
35
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est journalistic freedom."' 43 Although the fairness doctrine would
ensure equal time for opposing views, a right of access for paid editorial statements might allow "the affluent [to] determine in large
part the issues to be discussed" because the wealthy are most able to
purchase broadcast time.4 4 Given that the "interest of the public is
[the] foremost concern," the Court concluded that the first amend45
ment does not mandate access for paid editorials.
Eight years later, in CBS v. FCC,4 6 the Court upheld an
amended provision of the Communications Act of 1934 requiring
broadcasters to grant access upon request to individual candidates
for federal elective office. 47 The Court distinguished Democratic National Committee, noting that the statute in CBS v. FCC created only a
limited right of access. 48 Relying on Red Lion, the Court concluded
that FCC enforcement of this limited right of access did not violate
the broadcaster's first amendment rights because "'[ilt is the right
of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcaster, which
is paramount.' "49
Thus, the unique physical characteristics of the broadcast medium have required the judiciary to balance the divergent first
amendment rights of licensees, speakers, and the listening and viewing public. In FCC v. League of Women Voters5o the Supreme Court
was faced again with federal regulation of speech allegedly in furtherance of the "paramount" first amendment rights of listeners
and viewers.
II
THE CHALLENGE TO SECTION

399: FCC v. LEAGUE OF

WOMEN VOTERS

In April 1979 the League of Women Voters 5 ' brought suit in
federal district court challenging the constitutionality of section 399
43

44
45
46

Id. at 110.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 122.
453 U.S. 367 (1981).

47 The statute at issue was § 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act of 1934 as added
by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, -§103, 86 Stat. 3, 4
(1972). The law authorized the FCC to revoke the license of broadcasters who willfully
and repeatedly refuse access to a legally qualified candidate for federal elective office. 47
U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1982).
48
453 U.S. at 385-86.
49
Id. at 395 (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390). See also FCC v. National Citizens
Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (upholding FCC regulations disallowing
common ownership of radio or television station and daily newspaper in same community because of public interest in stimulating diverse viewpoints among those in control
of scarce resources).
50
104 S.Ct. 3106 (1984).
51 The plaintiffs also included the Pacifica Foundation, an owner-operator of sev-
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as then written. 52 The plaintiffs argued that the ban on editorializing violated both the first amendment and the equal protection
component of the fifth amendment. Senate counsel had the case
adjudged moot and dismissed after the Justice Department announced that it would not defend the statute. 53 While an appeal of
the dismissal was pending, the Justice Department under a new administration announced that it would defend the amended section
399. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals then remanded the case to
the district court because a justiciable controversy was now
54
present.
On remand, the district court tested the constitutionality of section 399 by a rigorous standard: the government had to show a
compelling interest that necessitated the ban and narrowly tailored
means to achieve that interest. 55 Although the district court recognized that the broadcast medium raises special considerations, the
court refused to apply a less exacting standard because the government failed to demonstrate "any special characteristic of the broadcast media which would justify the application of less stringent...
standards in the present case." 56 The court granted the plaintiffs
motion for summary judgment on the ground that section 399 violates the first amendment 5 7 but found that the fifth amendment
equal protection claim was not sufficiently developed for summary
judgment disposition.5 8 The government appealed directly to the
eral noncommercial educational broadcasting stations, and Congressman Henry Waxman, an interested listener.
52 As originally enacted in 1967, § 399 banned all "noncommercial educational
broadcasting station[s]" from engaging in editorializing. Public Broadcasting Act of
1967, Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365. The prohibition applied to public broadcast
stations regardless of whether they received funding from the CPB. In 1981 Congress
amended § 399 to limit the editorializing ban to those stations that receive funding from
the CPB. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357,
370.
53
In October 1979 the Department of Justice (DOJ) informed Congress that it
would not defend § 399. The Senate then intervened as amicus curiae in support of
§ 399 pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 288(a). Senate counsel then obtained dismissal of the action because no controversy ripe for adjudication remained. While appeal of this order
was pending, the DOJ, under a new administration, announced that it would defend
§ 399. At this point Congress amended § 399. In response to the 1981 amendments,
the appellees amended their complaint, limiting their challenge to the ban on
editorializing.
54
104 S. Ct. at 3113.
55 League of Women Voters v. FCC, 547 F. Supp. 379, 384 (1982).
56

Id.

Id. at 388.
Id. The crux of appellees' fifth amendment challenge was that the classification
of broadcasters embodied in § 399 constitutes a denial of equal protection. Appellees
argued that radio stations that-do not receive funds from the CPB, and therefore are
allowed to editorialize, are just as likely to become government propaganda organs as
those stations that receive funding from the CPB. Because the appellees prevailed on
57
58
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Supreme Court, 59 contending that "[t]he district court committed
fundamental error by requiring the government to show that Section 399 rested on . . a 'compelling interest.' "60
By a five to four vote, the Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's finding that section 399 violates the first amendment. Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, held that section 399 must be nar61
rowly tailored to serve only a substantial government interest.
The majority found that the proferred government interests were
"either not sufficiently substantial or. . . not served in a sufficiently
limited manner" to justify section 399's intrusion on first amendment rights. 6 2 In dissent three justices 63 argued that the editorializing ban is a valid condition on the receipt of government funding.64
Justice Stevens, dissenting in a separate opinion, asserted that because the editorializing ban is a viewpoint-neutral restriction, it con65
stitutes only a limited intrusion on first amendment rights.
Categorizing the government interests in section 399 as substantial,
Justice Stevens believed that section 399 is a legitimate restriction
66
under the first amendment.
A.

The Supreme Court Majority Opinion
1. The Applicable Standard of Review

The majority agreed with the government's contention that the
Court has not required that previous regulation of the broadcast
media meet a compelling interest test.6 7 The Court noted that it
had upheld the fairness doctrine in Red Lion and a limited right of
access for federal candidates in CBS v. FCC because both requirements served substantial government interests.68 The Court stated

that the district court's rigorous standard would be proper if the
editorializing ban applied to newspapers, and in such a case the
Court "would not hesitate to strike it down." 6 9 In the instant case,
however, given that the ban applies only to the broadcast media, the
their first amendment argument in the district court, they did not pursue the equal protection issue on appeal.
59 Direct appeal to the Supreme Court is permitted in a civil action in which the
United States is a party and a district court has held a federal statute unconstitutional. 28
U.S.C. § 1252 (1982).

Brief for the United States at 28, League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106.
104 S. Ct. at 3118.
Id. at 3129.
See supra note 2.
64 104 S. Ct. at 3131-32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 3134-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 3138.
67 Id. at 3115.
68 Id. at 3117-18.
69 Id. at 3115.
60
61
62
63
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compelling interest test is unwarranted. Moreover, the Court refused to reexamine the technological basis of spectrum scarcity
which underlies the legal division between the broadcast and print
media, stating that such a determination is the responsibility of Congress or the FCC. 70 Referring to the Court's prior efforts to balance
journalistic freedom against the public's right to be fully and fairly
informed, the Court stated that section 399 must be narrowly tailored to serve only a substantial government interest. 7 1
2.

The Nature of the Ban on Editorializing

Before analyzing the government's arguments in support of
section 399, the Court examined two central features of the ban on
editorializing. First, section 399 suppresses editorial opinion,
speech that "lies at the heart of First Amendment protection. ' 72
Second, the ban on editorializing is defined solely in terms of content: "[I]n order to determine whether a particular statement by
station management constitutes an 'editorial' proscribed by § 399,
enforcement authorities must necessarily examine the content of the
message that is conveyed to determine whether the views expressed
concern 'controversial issues of public importance.' ",7s
The Court then stated that facially section 399 impinges on the
first amendment right of free speech in its purest form because the
ban singles out particular speakers and prevents them from communicating with their chosen audience. 74 The Court analogized the editorializing ban to the actions of the New York Public Service
Commission that were declared unconstitutional in Consolidated
Edison v. Public Service Commission.7 5 In response to the Commission's
ban on utility bill inserts that discussed the utility's view on certain
controversial issues, the ConsolidatedEdison Court stated that "[t]he
First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not
only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition
of public discussion of an entire topic." 76 Given the FCC's broad
Id. at 3116 n.l1.
Id. at 3118.
72 Id. See also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) ("Suppression of the right
of the press to praise or criticize governmental agents and to clamor and contend for or
against change, which is all that this editorial did, muzzles one of the very agencies the
Framers of our Constitution. . .selected to [keep our society] free."); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (recognizing the "profound national commitment. . . that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open").
73
104 S.Ct. at 3119 (quoting In re Accuracy in Media, Inc., 45 F.C.C.2d 297, 302
(1973)).
74
Id. at 3120.
75 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
76 Id. at 537.
70
71
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definition of an "editorial," 77 the League of Women Voters Court found
that section 399 restricts the discussion of" 'controversial issues of
public importance.' "78 The Court then reasoned that Consolidated
Edison "appears" to control the disposition of section 399 because
79
the statute limits discussion of an entire topic.
3.

The Government's Interests in the EditorializingBan

The government advanced three principal arguments in support of section 399. It first argued that section 399 provides assurance that the federal government will not be able to subvert the
autonomy of local licensees and thereby turn them into propaganda
organs. 80 The government asserted that the power of the purse may
influence editorializing broadcasters to say what the government instructs them to say or, more subtly, to say what they think will please
the government. 8 ' Second, the government argued that section 399
will help prevent the broadcast media from becoming "a privileged
outlet for the political and ideological opinions of station owners."' 82 Because broadcast frequencies are a scarce resource, the
government contended that the ban is necessary to ensure evenhanded use of that resource. 83 Last, the government asserted that
by prohibiting CPB-funded stations from editorializing, Congress
has chosen not to subsidize broadcasters' editorials.8 4 Such a
choice, the government argued, is protected by the Court's recent
decision in Regan v. Taxation With Representation,8 5 which held that
Congress's refusal to allow tax-exempt lobbying organizations to receive tax deductible contributions is a reasonable exercise of the
86
spending power.
In response to the concern that absent the editorializing ban
the government might improperly influence broadcasters, the Court
stated that other provisions of the Public Broadcasting Act already
minimize opportunities for federal intrusion. 8 7 The Court pointed
to the creation of the CPB as an example of existing protections
77
78

See supra note 28.
104 S. Ct. at 3118 (quoting In re Accuracy in Media, Inc., 45 F.C.C.2d 297, 302

(1973)).
79

Id.

80
81
82
83
84
85
86

Brief for the United States at 35.
Id.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 33-34.
Id. at 42.
461 U.S. 540 (1983).
Id. at 550. Taxation With Representation maintained that § 501(c)(3) of the In-

ternal Revenue Code imposed an unconstitutional condition on the exercise of its first
amendment rights because the statute forces tax-exempt organizations to choose between lobbying and the receipt of tax deductible contributions.
87

League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. at3123.
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insulating licensees from political pressures.8 8 Further, the Court
questioned the premise underlying the government's argument:
that local editorializing will so anger Congress that the lawmakers
will retaliate by not funding public broadcasting.8 9 Noting that
there are hundreds of noncommercial educational broadcasters
whose voices are likely to be diverse, rather than monolithic, the
Court stated that the fear of retaliation en masse is unfounded. 9 0
Moreover, the Court pointed out that many broadcast editorials will
focus on purely local matters of little concern to the national
government. 9 1
The Court similarly disposed of the government's argument
that stations will become an outlet for a privileged few, finding that
section 399 is both over and underinclusive with respect to this concern. 9 2 To the extent that section 399 fails to prevent biased pro-

gramming, it is underinclusive. Section 399, the Court noted, does
little to prevent station owners from distorting their broadcasting to
communicate their personal views. 93 Despite the ban on editorials,
broadcasters still have discretion over programming, commentary,
panelist selection, and news reporting. In short, the court concluded that the editorializing ban falls short of its mark by dealing
94
with only one form of potential broadcast abuse.
The Court found the editorializing ban overinclusive because it
forbids speech that absent section 399 would be subject to the fairness doctrine. 95 Broadcast stations, the Court reasoned, will not become outlets for the sole propagation of licensees' personal
opinions because they are required to offer adequate coverage of
opposing viewpoints. 96 By ignoring the fairness doctrine, section
97
399 is overinclusive because it stifles speech unnecessarily.
Responding to the government's argument that section 399 is
constitutional because it represents Congress's decision not to pay
for licensees' editorials, the Court stated that reliance on Regan v.
Taxation With Representation9" is misplaced. 9 9 The Court distinguished Taxation With Representation by noting that the Internal Reve88
89
90

Id. at 3122. See supra notes 5-14 and accompanying text.
104 S. Ct. at 3123.

91
92
93
94
95

Id.

97
98

Id.
461 U.S. 540 (1983).
104 S. Ct. at 3128.

Id.

Id. at 3126.
Id.
Id. at 3127.
Id. For a description of the fairness doctrine, see supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
96
104 S. Ct. at 3127.
99
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nue Code sections involved there allowed tax-exempt lobbying
organizations to set up two distinct tax-exempt entities: one that
does not lobby and receives tax deductible contributions 10 0 and a
second organization that lobbies and does not receive tax deductible contributions. 10 1 The statutory scheme embodying section 399
does not allow a broadcaster to segregate its editorializing activities
from its other activities. 10 2 The Court agreed that Taxation With Representation would be applicable and section 399 would be constitutional if "noncommercial educational broadcasting stations [were
permitted] to establish 'affiliate' organizations which could then...
editorialize with non-federal funds."' 0 3
Having dismissed all the government's asserted interests in section 399, the Court found that the editorializing ban must fail under
first amendment scrutiny. The ban intrudes on core first amendment rights by foreclosing discussion of controversial topics by
broadcast licensees. Even under the reduced standard of "substantial interest," the Court concluded that the proferred government
justifications for section 399 "are either not sufficiently substantial
or are not served in a sufficiently limited manner to justify the substantial abridgment" of the first amendment rights imposed by the
04
statute.
B.

The Dissenting Opinions

Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
White, argued in dissent that Taxation With Representation should determine the outcome in League of Women Voters.' 0 5 Justice Rehnquist
viewed section 399 as a reasonable condition attached to the receipt
of federal funds. He accused the majority of "seeking] to avoid the
thrust" of Taxation With Representation by relying on that decision's
concurring opinion.10 6 The Justice stated that Taxation With Representation stands for the proposition that" 'a legislature's decision not
to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe
the right.' "107 Section 399, he argued, merely reflects the decision
100 Such an organization may be a § 501(c)(3) entity. I.R.G. § 501(c)(3) (1982). This
organization is tax-exempt and may receive tax deductible contributions but may not
lobby. Id.
101
104 S. Ct. at 3128. This organization is a § 501(c)(4) entity. It may seek to influence legislation, but as a consequence it may not receive tax deductible contributions.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (1982). Organizations qualifying as § 501(c)(4) entities are tax-exempt. Id.
102
104 S. Ct. at 3128.
103

Id.

104
105

Id. at 3129.

106

Id.

107

Id. (quoting Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. at 459).

104 S. Ct. at 3131 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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of Congress not to pay for editorializing. Justice Rehnquist concluded that the government's power to attach conditions to the distribution of its funds is not limitless, but he maintained that "when
the government is simply exercising its power to allocate its own
public funds, we need only find that the condition imposed has a
rational relationship to Congress' purpose in providing the subsidy"
and that the imposition of the condition is not aimed at the suppression of disfavored ideas.108
In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the majority
mischaracterized the nature of the section 399 editorializing ban:
"There is simply no sensible basis for considering this regulation a
viewpoint restriction-or, to use the Court's favorite phrase, to condemn it as 'content-based'. ... 109 Although Justice Stevens admitted that the ban is technically content-based, he maintained that
it does not have any of the impermissible features that frequently
characterize content-based restrictions. '1 0 Justice Stevens noted
that section 399 bans all editorials regardless of what the speaker
intends to say. In this respect, the Justice concluded, section 399 is
viewpoint-neutral. "'1
Justice Stevens argued that the Court's reliance on Consolidated
Edison 1 2 was misplaced because "critical differences" exist between
that case and League of Women Voters. 1 3 He noted that although the
prohibition on utility bill inserts at issue in Consolidated Edison was
couched in general terms, it actually was directed toward silencing
the utility companies. Justice Stevens reasoned that Consolidated
Edison "was a classic case of a viewpoint-based prohibition" of
speech, 14 whereas section 399 is viewpoint-neutral because the
licensees affected by the editorializing ban undoubtedly reflect a
myriad of views. 115
According to Justice Stevens, the government's interest in sec108
109

Id. at 3132.

104 S. Ct. at 3138 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110 Id. at 3134-35. Stevens stated that the viewpoint-neutrality of § 399 is of the
"greatest significance" in his analysis. Id. at 3135.
111
Id.
112
447 U.S. 530 (1980). The majority relied on Consolidated Edison to show that a
subject matter restriction intrudes on first amendment rights. A restriction of speech
based on its subject matter or its topic is content-based. Such restrictions, however, are
frequently viewpoint-neutral because the regulation restricts an entire subject rather
than a particular point of view. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text and infra
notes 141-71 and accompanying text.
113
104 S.Ct. at 3137 (Stevens, J,dissenting).
114
Id. at 3138. Justice Stevens wrote separately in ConsolidatedEdison, stating that
the circumstances leading to the bill insert ban demonstrated that the utility commission
was attempting to suppress the utilities' view on the nuclear power issue. Consolidated
Edison, 447 U.S. at 548 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
115
104 S. Ct. at 3138.
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tion 399, which he characterized as of "overriding importance,"', 1 6
must be balanced against this reduced first amendment infringement. He argued that the government's interest in maintaining the
integrity of the broadcast industry is particularly compelling because of the pervasiveness of the broadcast media in American society."1 7 These two factors, the viewpoint-neutrality of section 399
and the substantiality of the government's interest, persuaded Justice Stevens that the editorializing ban is constitutional.
III
ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court's conclusion that section 399 is unconstitutional is proper and consistent with first amendment precedent.
The Court properly rejected the argument that the ban on editorializing is a valid condition on the receipt of federal funds. Although
Congress need not fund educational broadcast stations, once it
chooses to do so, it may not condition the receipt of funding on
recipients' forfeiture of first amendment rights. 1 8 Furthermore,
Justice Stevens's argument that section 399 does not pose a serious
threat to first amendment values because it is viewpoint-neutral is
flawed. The Court's condemnation of subject matter restrictions
was warranted because such restrictions, although facially viewpoint-neutral, may hide viewpoint-discriminatory effects. 1 9 Further, Justice Stevens's bifurcated constitutional standard for
viewpoint-neutral and viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions on expression is difficult to apply, and ignores the fact that all subject
matter restrictions are somewhat discriminatory because they favor
the status quo. The Court properly rejected such an approach,
thereby encouraging unfettered discussion of controversial topics
and removing the confusion about the constitutional standard for
subject matter restrictions.
A.

The Conditioned Spending Argument

The Court properly determined that Regan v. Taxation With Representation120 is inapplicable to the facts and circumstances presented
in League of Women Voters. Taxation With Representation is inapposite
because Congress structured the Internal Revenue Code to avoid
subsidizing an organization's lobbying without penalizing the organization for its first amendment activity. Specifically, Congress
116
117

Id. at 3136.
Id.

See infra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
119 See infra notes 151-66 and accompanying text.
120. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
118
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could deny the benefit of tax deductible contributions to organizations that lobby without simultaneously disallowing tax deductible
contributions for a companion organizations' nonlobbying
activities.
Although section 399 may reflect Congress's decision not to
pay for broadcasters' editorializing, as Justice Rehnquist and the
FCC argued,' 2 1 the editorializing ban is not as finely tuned as the
tax code sections upheld in Taxation With Representation. To avoid
subsidizing broadcasters' editorials, section 399 prohibits all CPBfunded licensees from editorializing. The prohibition applies to
CPB-funded licensees regardless of whether the broadcaster actually.used the funds to support its editorial practices. As the majority
states, Taxation With Representationwould control if Congress had set
up a funding scheme that (1) prevented broadcasters from using
federal funds to support editorial activity and (2) provided federal
22
support for the broadcasters' noneditorial activity.'
An analysis of Cammaranov. United States123 illuminates the funding scheme distinction. In that case the Court upheld a treasury
regulation that denied business expense deductions for lobbying activities. The Court stated that "[p]etitioners are not being denied a
tax deduction because they engage in constitutionally protected activities."' 124 Rather, the Court noted, Congress had chosen not to
subsidize their lobbying activities. 125 In his concurrence, Justice
Douglas clarified the difference between a decision not to subsidize
protected activity and a penalty on the exercise of constitutional
rights. The Justice reasoned that if the regulation denied all business deductions because the taxpayer spent money to influence legislation then it would be an unconstitutional penalty levied on first
12 6
amendment activity.
Similarly, if Taxation With Representation was unable to receive any tax deductible contributions because of its lobbying activity, then the statutes in issue would penalize the exercise of
protected rights. Section 399 moves beyond a benign decision not
to subsidize licensee editorializing because it disallows editorializing
by a subsidized licensee regardless of whether the licensee uses the
federal funds for the editorials. It forces a noncommercial broadcast licensee to choose between federal support and the exercise of
a fundamental right.
121
122
123
124
125
126

See supra notes 84-86, 105-08 and accompanying text.
League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. at 3128.
358 U.S. 498 (1959).
Id. at 513.
Id.
Id. at 515 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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In League of Women Voters Justice Rehnquist argued that the
Court avoided the "thrust" of Taxation With Representation, relying
instead on its concurring opinions.' 27 Justice Rehnquist, author of
the majority opinion in Taxation With Representation, asserted that it
clearly held that the government's decision not to subsidize a funda-

mental right does not infringe on that right.' 28 Although the concurringJustices did emphasize that the special structure of the Code
was a key to avoiding an unconstitutional penalty, 129 the Taxation
With Representation majority also voiced this concern. Justice Rehnquist himself wrote, "The Code does not deny [Taxation With Representation] the right to receive deductible contributions to support
its non-lobbying activity, nor does it deny [Taxation With Representation] any independent benefit on account of its intention to
lobby."' 130 Thus the Taxation With Representation Court also recog-

nized that the structure of the Code insulated Congress's subsidy
decision from constitutional infirmities.
Somewhat surprisingly, the Court did not rely on Sherbert v. Verner 13 ' to counter Justice Rehnquist's conditional spending argument. In Sherbert the state of South Carolina denied unemployment
compensation to a Seventh Day Adventist because she was unwilling
to accept employment that entailed work on Saturdays. The state
supreme court upheld the denial of benefits by the state agency. 132
The Supreme Court observed that the state agency ruling would
force a religious adherent to choose between valid religious beliefs
and the receipt of government benefits. 133 The Court stated that
"4governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of
burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed
against appellant for her Saturday worship."' 134 The Court stressed
104 S. Ct. at 3131 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id.
Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 552 (1983) (Blackmun,J.,
concurring).
130 Id. at 545.
131
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
132
Sherbert v. Verner, 240 S.C. 286, 125 S.E.2d 737 (1962).
133 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
'34 Id. See Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (government may not suppress rights of public employees by requiring that they forgo their rights or face termination of their employment); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div.,
450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981) (state may not deny unemployment benefits because individual refused to manufacture weapons on religious grounds).
Sherbert v. Verner and the cases cited above stand in sharp contrast to jurists' views
earlier in this century. Judge Holmes's remarks in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford,
155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892), are typical of the earlyjudicial attitude toward conditions attached to a benefit provided by a government. In McAulife the city fired a policeman from his job for violating a regulation forbidding politicking. Denying the
policeman's constitutional arguments, Judge Holmes stated, "The petitioner may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."
127
128
129
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that whether the benefits were a privilege or a right was inconsequential: "It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of
conditions upon a benefit or privilege."' 3 5 Finding that the state
did not have a compelling interest to justify the infringement of reli36
gious liberty the Sherbert Court struck down the state rule.'
The Constitution does not compel the government to subsidize
the exercise of all fundamental rights. 3 7 Further, Congress's deciId. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517. The Supreme Court later repudiated this harsh result in Frost
& Frost Trucking v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926) (with now-Justice Holmes
dissenting). In that case petitioners, in the business of transporting produce by truck,
argued that a California statute effectively changed their status to that of a common
carrier. Id. at 591. The state argued that because it could withhold the privilege of
transacting private business on the public highways, it could grant the privilege with
conditions. Id. The Court stated that the real issue is whether the state can do indirectly
what it cannot do directly: "If so, constitutional guaranties, so carefully safeguarded
against direct assault, are open to destruction by the indirect but no less effective process of requiring a surrender, which, though in form voluntary, in fact lacks none of the
elements of compulsion." Id. at 593.
135
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. The Sherbert Court relied, in large part, on Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). In Speiser California required otherwise eligible recipients
of a property tax exemption to sign a loyalty oath before they could realize the benefit.
The appellants refused to sign the oath and were denied the tax exemption. The Court
held that "[t]o deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is
in effect to penalize them for such speech." Id. at 518.
The Court affirmed and explicitly strengthened Speiser and Sherbert in Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). In Perry a teacher at a state college was denied reemployment without a hearing allegedly because of his political views. The Court held this
denial violative of the due process clause and further stated:
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though
a person has no "right" to a valuable government benefit and even
though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely.
It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech.
Id. at 597. See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (provision of state welfare
law that denies benefits to persons who have not yet resided in state for one year violates
equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment because it impermissibly inhibits migration). But cf Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (home visit is constitutional as
precondition to continued receipt of AFDC because not search within meaning of fourth
amendment); Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research, 104 S.Ct. 3348
(1984) (law conditioning receipt of federal education assistance on compliance with
draft registration requirements not violative of fifth amendment even though law posed
unregistered students with choice between foregoing educational assistance and confessing their illegal behavior by late registration). See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of
the Right-Privilege Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968); Note,
UnconstitutionalConditions, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1595 (1960); Comment, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 144 (1968).
136 374 U.S. at 406. The Court stated that no mere "showing ... of a rational
relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice," rather South Carolina must
come forward with a compelling state interest tojustify its interference with first amendment rights. Id.
137
See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). In that case a regulation of the
Connecticut Welfare Department limited state medicaid funds to first trimester abor-
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sion not to support the exercise of a fundamental right with the
38
spending power should not be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.'
The government should not, however, be allowed to penalize the
exercise of a fundamental right either by denying funding because
an otherwise qualified person chooses to exercise a protected right
or by requiring a person to surrender such a right as a prerequisite
to the receipt of federal support. The Sherbert Court stated emphatically that conditions on public spending cannot stand, "[w]hatever
their purpose," if they "inhibit or deter the exercise of first amendment freedoms."' 13 9 Justice Rehnquist's position that there need be
only a rational relationship 40 between the condition and Congress's
purpose in providing the subsidy and that the condition not be
aimed at the suppression of "dangerous ideas" lends itself to governmental overreaching at the expense of constitutional guarantees.
A rational relationship standard offers the spectre of the government buying up fundamental rights through the distribution of its
largesse.

tions that are medically necessary. Petitioners, two indigent women who were unable to
get the requisite physician letter attesting to medical necessity, argued that the state
regulation penalized their exercise of a fundamental right. The Court denied their
claim, stating that the state is under no obligation to remove obstacles not of its own
making. The Court reasoned that Sherbert v. Verner would apply only if Connecticut denied all welfare benefits to qualified women who obtained abortions. Id. at 475. See also
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 n.19 ("[A] refusal to fund protected activity, without
more, cannot be equated with the imposition of a 'penalty' on that activity.").
138 The manner in which the government distributes its largesse, of course, is subject to constitutional scrutiny pursuant to the equal protection clause of the fifth or fourteenth amendments. See, e.g., San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17
(1973) (equal protection analysis applied to state's method of funding public elementary
and secondary schools).
139
374 U.S. at 405.
140
Precedent does support Rehnquist's assertion that the condition must satisfy
only a rational relationship standard. This precedent, however, is old, and its value is
questionable. See, e.g., American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
This case upheld what is commonly referred to as the nonCommunist affidavit provision
of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947. Section 9(h) required officers of national labor unions to execute an affidavit stating that they are not members of the Communist Party. The government argued that this "condition" was valid because the
penalty only denied noncomplying unions the privilege of accessing the NLRB. Id. at
389. The Court dismissed this argument but upheld the law because the affidavit provision had a rational relationship to the overall goal of peaceful labor-management relations. See also United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (upholding § 9(a)
of Hatch Act which precluded certain employees of executive branch from taking active
part in political campaigns because ban was rationally related to goal of politically neutral civil service). Justice Rehnquist cited Mitchell as support in League of Women Voters,
104 S.Ct. at 313 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting), but the persuasive value of the case is minimal. The Court had previously discredited Mitchell in Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138,
144 (1983).
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Subject Matter Restrictions

In recent years the Supreme Court has divided governmental
regulation of speech into two categories: those restrictions that are
content-based and those that are content-neutral. 141 Content-neutral restrictions regulate expressive activity without regard to the
message sought to be conveyed by the speaker.1 4 2 Content-based
restrictions regulate speech because of its meaning.' 4 3 The Court
has subjected content-based restrictions of speech to heightened
scrutiny because of the widely shared belief that the government
must not favor or disfavor any particular point of view. 144 As the
Court has stated, "[t]he essence of. . forbidden censorship is con145
tent control."'
The Court's distinction between content-based and contentneutral restrictions has been the subject of considerable criticism.
Professor Redish, for example, observes that "[w]hile governmental
attempts to regulate the content of expression undoubtedly deserve
strict judicial review, it does not logically follow that equally serious
threats to first amendment freedoms cannot derive from restrictions
imposed to regulate expression in a manner unrelated to content."146 Despite these and other doubts 14 7 as to the efficacy of the
distinction, the content-based/content-neutral dichotomy is "the
most pervasively employed doctrine in the jurisprudence of free
141
For a discussion of the development of this distinction, see Stephen, The First
Amendment and Content Discrimination,68 VA. L. REV. 203, 214-31 (1982).
142 See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2 (1978) (describing government's abridgement of speech when it is pursuing other goals).
143
Id. (describing government action aimed at suppressing specific viewpoints).
144
Id. ("any government action aimed at communicative impact is presumptively at
odds with the first amendment"). See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 776 (1976) (invalidating government
prohibition on exchange of price information of over-the-counter drugs); Erzoznick v.
City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211 (1975) (striking down municipal ordinance that
regulated display of outdoor films based on their content). Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (invalidating ordinance prohibiting picketing because it allowed
labor picketing but disallowed all other demonstrations).
145
Police Dep't v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1976).
146
Redish, The Content Distinction in FirstAmendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REv. 113,
150 (1981).
147 Justice Marshall's dissent in Clark v. Community for Creative Nonviolence, 104
S. Ct. 3065, 3073 (1984), reflects considerable dissatisfaction with the contentbased/content-neutral dichotomy. The Justice noted, "By narrowly limiting its concern
to whether a given regulation creates a content-based distinction, the Court has seemingly overlooked the fact that content-neutral restrictions are also capable of unnecessarily restricting protected expressive activity." Id. at 3079. Marshall observed that a
content-neutral restriction may not fall with equal force on all potential speakers because inequalities in wealth may make access to alternative forums impossible for some
speakers. Id. at n.14.
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expression." 14 8
The meaning and application of the distinction in the case of
restrictions of speech based on its subject matter, however, has baffled the Court. 14 9 Subject matter restrictions define the proscribed
speech not by the speaker's viewpoint but by the topic of the proposed speech. For instance, in United States Civil Service Commission v.
0 federal legislation prohibited
National Association of Letter Carriers,15
certain public employees from expressing opinions "'on public affairs, personalities and matters of public interest' " if their comments are directed toward the success of a political party.' 5 ' The
legislation thus restricted an entire subject area rather than a single
viewpoint. Consider also the restriction at issue in Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights, 152 which allowed individuals to lease commercial advertising space on city buses but disallowed the placement of political messages on the vehicles. 153 As in Letter Carriers, this restriction
proscribed an entire subject area rather than one viewpoint. In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission' 54 the Court determined the constitutionality of a ban on utility bill inserts that dealt
with controversial issues of public policy. This regulation also defined the proscribed activity in terms of its subject matter: contro55
versial issues of public importance.'
The Court's inconsistent treatment of these and other restrictions on the subject matter of speech illustrates its confusion. In
ConsolidatedEdison and Police Departmentof Chicago v. Mosely, 156 for instance, the Court equated subject matter restrictions with contentbased, viewpoint-discriminatory regulations and subjected them to
strict judicial scrutiny. 157 In Lehman, Letters Carriers, Greer v. Spock, 158
148

Stone, Content Regulation and the FirstAmendment, 25 Wm. &MARY L. REv. 189, 189

(1983).
149
Stone, supra note 148, at 239-42; Redish, supra note 146, at 117-18. See generally
Karst, Equality as a Central Principlein the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20 (1975);
Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content: The PeculiarCase of Subject-Matter Restric-

tions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81 (1978).

150
151
152
153
'54
155

413 U.S. 448 (1973).
Id. at 556 (quoting United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947)).
418 U.S. 298 (1974).
Id. at 300.
447 U.S. 530 (1980).

Id. at 537.

408 U.S. 92 (1972) (invalidating city ordinance that prohibited picketing near
school building but exempted peaceful labor picketing on first amendment and equal
protection grounds).
157
The Mosley Court required the city to demonstrate that its regulation served a
"substantial" interest. Id. at 99. In ConsolidatedEdison the Court required that the bill
insert ban serve a compelling state interest. 447 U.S. at 540.
158
424 U.S. 838 (1976) (upholding prohibition of partisan political speech at military base).
156
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and Young v. American Mini Theaters,159 on the other hand, the Court
treated the restrictions as content-neutral and subjected them to a
relaxed standard of review. 160 Observing the Court's disparate
treatment of subject matter restrictions, Professor Stone noted,
"The confusion generated by subject-matter restrictions is hardly
surprising, for such restrictions fall between viewpoint-based and
content-neutral restrictions, sharing some of the characteristics of
each."161

In League of Women Voters the Court once again faced a regulation that defines the proscribed speech in terms of its subject matter.
Section 399 prohibits CPB-funded licensees from
editorializing.162 The FCC, the agency charged with enforcing section 399, defined an editorial as the use of broadcast facilities "for
163
the propagation of the licensees' own views on public issues."
Thus, section 399, as applied, defines the proscribed speech in
terms of its subject matter, the licensees' views on public issues, without
reference to the viewpoint of any single commentator.
The Court's analysis of section 399's ban on editorializing demonstrates that a majority of the Court is willing to equate subject
matter restrictions with content-based, viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions on speech. The Court objected to section 399 because it
attempts "to limit discussion of controversial topics and thus to
shape the agenda for public debate."' 164 Although the Court tested
the constitutionality of section 399 with a slightly less exacting standard than that usually applied to viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions, this is attributable to the traditionally low level of scrutiny
applied to governmental regulation of the broadcast industry. 16 5
Although viewpoint-neutral subject matter restrictions on
speech are arguably less worrisome intrusions on free speech than
viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions, the League of Women Voters
Court properly chose to equate the two categories of regulation.
Viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions skew the operation of the free
marketplace of ideas by limiting the flow of information and opinion
to the public, thereby disrupting the process of democratic self-gov159
427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding city zoning ordinance that required theaters
showing sexually explicit films to be dispersed throughout city).
160
As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983), "[a]lthough Greer, Lehman andJonespermitted contentbased restrictions, none of the cases involved viewpoint discrimination." Id. at 61
(Brennan, J., dissenting).

161
162
163

Stone, supra note 148, at 241.
See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
In re Accuracy in Media, Inc., 45 F.C.C.2d 297, 302 (1973).

164
165

League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. at 3120.
See supra notes 31-49 and accompanying text.
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ernment. 16 6 A desire to maintain the workings of the marketplace,
where ideas are accepted or rejected on their merits, clearly justifies
the Court's strict scrutiny of viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions.
Although by definition viewpoint-neutral restrictions do not favor
any idea over another, such restrictions, including section 399, also
interrupt the free flow of information, thus disrupting individual
67
decisionmaking and the process of informed self-government.
Moreover, subject matter restrictions are, to some extent, inevitably
viewpoint-discriminatory because they necessarily favor the status
quo. For example, the legislative history of section 399 suggests
that several legislators supported the editorializing ban simply because they feared speech.' 68 Specific Congressmen may have worred about criticism from the political left or from the right, but they
all had the same illegitimate purpose: the suppression of criticism.
Subject matter restrictions also may hide viewpoint-discriminatory effects, and in some cases these effects may be difficult to discover. The ban on utility bill inserts at issue in Consolidated Edison
provides an example of a facially viewpoint-neutral subject matter
restriction that was discriminatory in practice. Although the bill insert ban was allegedly viewpoint-neutral because it banned all inserts, it was plainly aimed at a particular speaker's viewpoint on a
specific issue. 16 9 The Court's opinion in Consolidated Edison suggested that subject matter restrictions always warrant strict judicial
scrutiny.' 7 0 The obvious viewpoint-discriminatory effects of the
regulation then under review diluted the holding, however. The effects of section 399 were more ambiguous because of the presumption that CPB-funded licensees reflect a myriad of viewpoints.
Thus, the Court's refusal to tolerate the arguably viewpoint-neutral
restriction at issue in League of Women Voters demonstrates that the
Court is unwilling to engage in the difficult task of searching for
166

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)

("Speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of selfgovernment ....
"). The principal proponent of the fundamental role that the first
amendment plays in the democratic process is A. Meiklejohn. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLrrICAL FREEDOM (1965).
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The Mosely Court recognized this: "To allow a government the choice of permis-

sible subjects for public debate would be to allow that government control over the
search for political truth." 447 U.S. at 538.
168 See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
169 The public utility commission denied the public the right to use the utilities' bills
as a medium and simultaneously restricted the utilities' ability to present their views on
controversial issues of public importance. The public never had access to the utilities'
billing system, however, whereas the utility was prohibited from continuing to engage in
an ongoing practice. 477 U.S. at 532.

170 Id. at 537-40 (prohibition of viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions extends to
subject matter restriction).
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hidden viewpoint-discriminatory effects. 17 1
CONCLUSION

In FCC v. League of Women Voters the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a ban on editorializing by CPB-funded licensees. The
Court's holding demonstrates that it is unwilling to allow the government to use its spending power as a lever to entice recipients to
forfeit their constitutional rights. Given the ubiquitous role that the
federal government plays in our society, the Court's decision should
be lauded.
Further, the Court refused to consider section 399 a less threatening restriction of speech merely because it is a viewpoint-neutral
subject matter regulation. The danger such restrictions present is
that they may hide viewpoint-discriminatory effects. Indeed, at a
minimum, all subject matter restrictions discriminate to a certain extent by favoring the status quo. Moreover, even if such a regulation
is viewpoint-neutral, the curtailment of speech on important public
issues runs counter to our commitment to wide-ranging debate.
Thus, the Court's close scrutiny of section 399 is well founded and
in general removes the confusion that has surrounded subject matter restrictions.
Benjamin Marcus
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In ConsolidatedEdison Justice Stevens saw through the facial neutrality of the bill
insert ban and concluded that it was an impermissible viewpoint restriction. Id. at 546
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Nevertheless, the Justice chose only to concur in
the judgment because of the majority's broad language condemning all subject matter
restrictions. Justice Stevens thus favors a middle course with regard to subject matter
restrictions; his dissent in League of Women Voters follows from his conclusion that § 399 is
viewpoint-neutral and his valuation of the government's proferred justifications for the
editorializing ban.

